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CRIMINAL LAW-HOBBs ACT-APPLICATION OF THE HOBBS ACT
IN LOCAL POLITICAL CORRUPTION PROSECUTIONS BY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1946, Congress passed the Hobbs Act (Act) ' in order to protect in-
terstate commerce from the ravages of racketeering activity. 2 The Act was
designed as a criminal statute proscribing both robbery and extortion.
3
The Act's prohibition of extortion-i.e., "the obtaining of property from
another with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence or fear, or under color of official right" 4 -has been consist-
ently utilized as a means of prosecuting political corruption.5 The courts,
however, have struggled with this definition to determine whether a viola-
1. Act of July 3, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-486, ch. 537, 60 Stat. 420 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1951 (1976)).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1360. The stated objective of the Act was "to prevent anyone from obstructing,
delaying or affecting commerce, or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce by
robbery or extortion .... Id. at 9, reprinted in [1946] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
1370.
At the time of the debates on the Hobbs Act, the term "racketeering" was not expressly
defined in any federal statute. However, one court had defined it as "the organized use of
threats, coercion, intimidation, and use of violence to compel the payment for actual or alleged
services of arbitrary or excessive charges under the guise of membership dues, protection fees,
royalties or service rates .... United States v. McGlone, 19 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa.
1937) (prosecution of labor leader under federal law).
3. See Act of July 3, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-486, ch. 537, § 1, 60 Stat. 420 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1951 (1976)). The Act provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts
or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property
in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section-
(1) The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking of personal property from
the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or
threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person
or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of
a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the
taking or obtaining.
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)-(b) (1976). For cases applying the Act, see, e.g., United States v. Culbert,
435 U.S. 371 (1978) (robbery prosecution); United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.
1980) (extortion prosecution). For a general discussion of the Hobbs Act, see Note, A New
Federal Antiracketeering Law, 35 GEO. L.J. 362 (1947). See also Annot., 4 A.L.R. FED. 881
(1970).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2) (1976). See note 3 supra.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 445 U.S. 360 (1980) (state senator); United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972) (city mayor). See also cases cited at notes 10 & 11 infra.
(1005)
1
Robbins: Criminal Law - Hobbs Act - Application of the Hobbs Act in Local
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tion of the Hobbs Act is established solely by a showing that property was
received under color of official right, or whether an element of duress is also
required. 6  The current trend in Hobbs Act cases is to construe the term
"extortion" liberally.'
The combination of the liberal construction afforded the term "extor-
tion" by the judiciary8 and the broad jurisdictional scope of the Act 9 has
provided federal prosecutors with a potent weapon with which to combat
political corruption on both state10 and local levels.1 1 Indeed, the impor-
tance of the Hobbs Act in prosecuting political corruption 12 is underscored
by the indictments handed down in the "ABSCAM" cases wherein the Act
was the basis for prosecuting several prominent politicians.' 3  This note will
evaluate the current trend in Hobbs Act political corruption prosecutions,
with special emphasis on the decisional stance of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in light of the numerous decisions of first im-
pression within that circuit. In addition, this note will suggest that Supreme
Court review or legislative action would be appropriate to determine
whether such prosecutions were actually contemplated by Congress.
II. THE HOBBS ACT AND ITS JUDICIAL GLOSS
A. Background
In 1934, Congress passed the Anti-Racketeering Act 14 in an effort to
quell the widespread racketeering which was disrupting the flow of interstate
6. Compare United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914
(1972) (duress not an element) with United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1965)
(duress essential). See notes 23-31 & 45-52 and accompanying text infra.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 425 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980). See also notes
45-62 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 45-62 and accompanying text infra.
9. See note 36 and accompanying text infra; note 70 infra.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919
(1976) (state governor); United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1058 (1972) (state attorney general).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
819 (1976) (redevelopment authority director); United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972) (city mayor).
12. See generally Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Mak-
ing of Law Enforcement, 65 CEO. L.J. 1171 (1977); Stern, Prosecutions of Local Political Cor-
ruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3
SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1971); Note, Extortion "Under Color of Official Right": Federal Pros-
ecution of Official Corruption under the Hobbs Act, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 513 (1974).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, Nos. 80-166-(1)-(4) (E.D. Pa. filed May 22, 1980). In
Criden, an indictment, which included a Hobbs Act count, was returned against four defen-
dants. Id. See also Philadelphia Inquirer, May 23, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 5. The nature of the
ABSCAM cases are explained in T. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 510-111 (5th ed. 1980).
14. Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-376, ch. 569, §§ 1-6, 48 Stat. 979-80 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976)). The Anti-Racketeering Act provided in pertinent part:
Any person who, in connection with or in relation to any act in any way or in any degree
affecting trade or commerce or any article or commodity moving or about to move in
trade or commerce-
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commerce. 15 This enactment, however, proved inadequate after the United
States Supreme Court held that labor union activities were not within the
ambit of the Anti-Racketeering Act.' 6  Congress, recognizing this defi-
ciency, 17 amended the statute by adopting the Hobbs Act. 18
During the congressional debates on the Hobbs Act, 19 a number of New
York legislators argued against passage of the bill because they considered it
to be an anti-labor measure.2 0  The Act's proponents sought to assuage the
opposition by pointing out that the proposed legislation was quite similar to
New York's extortion law.2 ' This reference led a number of federal courts
to interpret the Hobbs Act in light of New York decisional law.
2 2
(b) Obtains the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of force or
fear, or under color of official right; or
(d) Conspires or acts concertedly with any other persons to commit any of the foregoing
acts; shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by impris-
onment from one to ten years or by a fine of $10,000, of both.
Id. For a discussion of the cases decided under the 1934 Anti-Racketeering Act, see Annot., 138
A.L.R. 811 (1942).
15. See 78 CONG. REC. 448-53 (1934). During the congressional debates on the Anti-
Racketeering Act, it was established that the poultry racket alone cost Americans hundreds of
thousands of dollars annually. Id. at 452 (remarks of Senator Copeland). The debates also indi-
cated that increased mobility had caused racketeering and other crimes to become interstate in
character. Id. at 451 (remarks of Senator Vandenberg). The Anti-Racketeering Act was designed
to control such interstate rackets. Id. at 452 (remarks of Senator Copeland).
16. United States v. Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942). In Local 807,
the defendant union prevented out-of-state truck drivers from making deliveries in New York
unless a fee was paid to the local. Id. at 526. Subsequently, the union was prosecuted for
extortion under the Anti-Racketeering Act. Id. at 527. On appeal, the Supreme Court found
that Congress had not intended to proscribe labor union activities through the Anti-
Racketeering Act. Id. at 531.
17. See 91 CONG. REC. 11841 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Cox); id. at 11842 (remarks of
Congressman Michener); id. at 11900 (remarks of Congressman Hancock). Several Congressmen
expressed the view that the Supreme Court in "the Teamsters Union case, . . . legitimatized
highway robbery when committed by a labor goon." Id. at 11841 (remarks of Congressman
Cox).
18. See notes 1-3 and accompanying text supra.
19. See 91 CONG. REC. 11839-48, 11899-922 (1945).
20. Id. at 11901-02 (remarks of Congressman Celler); id. at 11917-18 (remarks of Con-
gressman Marcantonio). For a general discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see United
States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 401-08 (1973).
21. See 91 CONG. REC. 11900 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Hobbs). Congressman Hobbs
stated: "[T]here is nothing clearer than the definitions of robbery and extortion in this bill. They
have been construed by the courts not once, but a thousand times. The definitions in this bill
are copied from the New York Code substantially." Id.
The New York statute provided: "Extortion is the obtaining of property from another ...
with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right."
Penal Law of 1909, § 850, as amended, Laws of 1917, ch. 518, reprinted in N.Y. Penal Law,
appendix § 850 (McKinney 1975) (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.40 (McKinney
1975)).
22. See United States v. Critchley, 353 F.2d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 1965) (extortion); United
States v. Nedley, 255 F.2d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1958) (robbery); United States v. Kubacki, 237 F.
Supp. 638, 641 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (extortion). See also notes 23-67 and accompanying text infra.
1979-1980] 1007
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B. The Third Circuit's Adoption of the New York Approach
The first Hobbs Act decision which explicitly applied the New York
definition of extortion was United States v. Kubacki,23 a district court case in
which the mayor of Reading, Pennsylvania, and another individual were
charged with extortion based on their alleged demand of a kickback on a city
contract to purchase parking meters. 24  The Kubacki court began its analysis
by pointing out that New York law was to be examined in interpreting the
Hobbs Act. 2s Since New York case law indicated that extortion and bribery
are mutually exclusive, 26 the Kubacki court felt compelled to treat the
Hobbs Act prosecution accordingly 2 7 and proceeded by focusing upon
whether the victim had acted volitionally or under duress.
28
The Kubacki court concluded that duress was the essence of extortion 
2 9
and that the essence of duress was the victim's fear of interference with, or
loss of, an existing property right.30 On the facts before it, the court con-
23. 237 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
24. Id. at 640. The defendants in Kubacki were indicted for violations of both the Hobbs
Act and the Travel Act. Id. at 639-40.
The Travel Act prohibits traveling or use of facilities in interstate commerce with the intent
to commit extortion or bribery or other crimes in violation of state or federal law. 18 U.S.C. §
1952 (1976). See generally Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (1979) (bribery); United States
v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969) (extortion); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.
1973) (bribery).
25. 237 F. Supp. at 641. In support of its proposition that the definition of extortion in the
Hobbs Act is borrowed from New York law, the court cited a prior Third Circuit case which
involved a robbery prosecution under the Hobbs Act. Id., citing United States v. Nedley, 255
F.2d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 1958). For a discussion of the Congressional debates on the Hobbs Act,
see notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
26. See People v. Dioguardi, 8 N.Y.2d 260, 168 N.E.2d 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1960). In
Dioguardi, a business concern gave the defendant a sum of money in order to secure labor
peace. Id. at 266-67, 168 N.E.2d at 687-88, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 876. As a result, the defendant was
indicted for extortion. Id. at 268, 168 N.E.2d at 688, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 877. The New York Court
of Appeals held that, because bribery and extortion are mutually exclusive, a defendant indicted
for extortion was entitled to acquittal if the jury found that the defendant's acts constituted
bribery instead. Id. at 273, 168 N.E.2d at 692, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
27. 237 F. Supp. at 641-42.
28. Id. at 641. The duress requirement is derived from the New York interpretation of
extortion, which focuses on the victim's state of mind to determine whether an offense commit-
ted under color of office is bribery or extortion. See People v. Dioguardi, 8 N.Y.2d 260, 275,
168 N.E.2d 683, 693, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870, 883 (1960).
29. 237 F. Supp. at 641. See People v. Dioguardi, 8 N.Y.2d 260, 273, 168 N.E.2d 683, 692,
203 N.Y.S.2d 870, 882 (1960). For a discussion of Dioguardi, see note 26 supra. See also People
v. Feld, 262 A.D. 909, 28 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1941) (union officials who threatened strike could not
be guilty of extortion if they were bribed). Cf. Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, 22 Misc. 2d
996, 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 266 A.D. 659, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1943), aff'd,
292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740, 43 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1944) (per curiam) (essence of bribery is volun-
tary giving of something of value, while showing of compulsion indicates extortion; compelled
payments of corporate funds to labor union officials found to be extortion, not bribery).
30. 237 F. Supp. at 641-42. Thus, the Kubacki court implied that the element of fear is
necessary for conviction under the Hobbs Act, whether the prosecution is based on the obtain-
ment of property "induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or fear" or
"under color of official right." Id. at 642. See note 3 supra.
The New York approach to extortion, therefore, created an anomalous situation whereby
individuals charged with Hobbs Act extortion could seek acquittal on the ground that they were
1008 [VOL. 25: p. 1005
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cluded that, inasmuch as the loss or interference threatened was that of a
prospective property right, duress, and thus extortion, had not been estab-
lished.3 1
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
adopted the New York approach in a political corruption prosecution, United
States v. Addonizio.32  In Addonizio, the jury found that the defendants had
used their official positions with the Newark, New Jersey, city government
to secure "kickbacks" from local contractors. 33  On appeal, the defendants
challenged their convictions on several grounds, including the jurisdictional
reach of,34 and the interpretation of the term "extortion" under, the Hobbs
Act.3 5  The Third Circuit disposed of the jurisdictional question by stating
that "[tihe reach of the Hobbs Act ... outlaws extortion which obstructs
interstate commerce 'in any way or degree.' "36 The Addonizio court dealt
with the extortion issue by noting that the New York definition of extortion
controls in Hobbs Act prosecutions. 37 Thus, the court found that the
"kickbacks" required by the defendants provided the element of duress
which, under New York law, is the essence of extortion. 38  Moreover, the
instead guilty of accepting a bribe. See United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 72 (3d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972). As one court remarked: "Proof of the state of mind of
the victim is relevant, indeed essential, to a prosecution for extortion .... " United States v.
Kennedy, 291 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir. 1961) (prosecution for extortion under the Hobbs Act). In
New York, a defendant charged with extortion would be likely to assert the same argument
since the penalty for extortion is more severe than the penalty for bribery. Compare N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 155.40 (McKinney 1975) (extortion punishable by a maximum of 15 years impris-
onment) with id. § 200.10 (bribery punishable by a maximum of seven years imprisonment).
In 1965, the New York legislature expressly eliminated such a defense by providing that
extortion and bribery are not mutually exclusive. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.10 (McKinney
1975) (receipt of bribe is no defense to a prosecution for larceny committed by means of extor-
tion); id. § 135.70 (receipt of bribe is no defense in coercion prosecution); id. § 180.30 (claim of
extortion is no defense in bribery prosecution of labor official); id. § 200.15 (claim of extortion is
no defense in prosecution for bribery).
For a discussion of the rationale behind the introduction of these provisions, see id. §
200.15, Practice Commentaries.
31. 237 F. Supp. at 641-42. The defendants convicted under the Travel Act. Id. at 644. For
a discussion of the Travel Act as an alternate basis for prosecuting political corruption, see notes
87-92 & 96-98 and accompanying text infra.
32. 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972).
33. 451 F.2d at 54. The city officials had an understanding with all suppliers on a city
project that contracts would be awarded only to those suppliers who agreed to provide
"kickbacks" to the officials. Id. at 54-58.
34. Id. at 76. The defendants contended that the effect of the purported illegal activities on
interstate commerce was so attenuated as to preclude prosecution under the Act. Id. For dis-
cussion of the jurisdictional aspect of the Hobbs Act, see notes 47 & 70 infra; text accompanying
note 90 infra.
35. 451 F.2d at 72-73. The defendants' arguments relating to extortion under the Hobbs Act
were based on two grounds: 1) the evidence adduced at trial could only support a bribery
charge; and 2) the payments made to secure future contract rights were not property within the
meaning of the definition of the term "extortion" under the Act. Id.
36. Id. at 76-77, quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960). For a further
discussion of Stirone, see note 70 infra.
37. 451 F.2d at 72.
38. Id. at 72-73. The court explained that economic fear was clearly present in the case and,
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court indicated that the fact that the payments were induced in exchange for
prospective, rather than existing, property rights had no significance. 39  The
court concluded that the defendants' activitities fit within the proscription of
the Hobbs Act 40 and, therefore, their convictions were affirmed.
41
While the adoption of the New York approach to extortion under the
Hobbs Act led to criticism, 42 it nevertheless provided a convenient reference
for the judiciary in deciding the single Hobbs Act extortion prosecution 
43
conducted prior to the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Kenny.44
C. The Third Circuit's Abandonment of the New York Approach
The defendants in Kenny, all high level public or political officials, 45
were indicted for their alleged involvement in a large-scale "kickback"
scheme in violation of both the Hobbs Act 46 and the Travel Act.4 7  At trial,
39. Id. at 73. But see United States v. Kubacki, 237 F. Supp. at 641-42. For a discussion of
Kubacki, see notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
40. 451 F.2d at 73.
41. Id. at 78.
42. See Stern, supra note 12, at 1-2. Judge Stern charged that the distinction between
bribery and extortion read into the Hobbs Act by Kubacki was unnecessary and arbitrary: "The
effect of this distinction, when applied, is to preclude convictions where, in the mind of the
court or of the jury, bribery, and not extortion, is proven." Id. Criticism was also leveled
against the Kubacki requirement of a showing of fear in the victim in all Hobbs Act prosecu-
tions. Id. at 14.
43. See United States v. Quinn, 364 F. Supp. 432, 438 (N.D. Ga. 1973), affd, 514 F.2d
1250 (5th Cir. 1975).
44. 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
45. 462 F.2d at 1211.
46. Id. at 1210. Count I of the indictment, the Hobbs Act count, charged that the defen-
dants had conspired to obstruct commerce by impeding progress on municipal projects in order
to obtain property from contractors with their consent induced by the wrongful use of fear and
under color of official right. Id.
47. Id. at 1210-11. Count II charged the defendants with conspiracy to violate the Travel
Act by using the facilities of interstate commerce to commit bribery and extortion in violation of
the laws of New Jersey. Id. at 1211.
The Travel Act forbids interstate or foreign travel, or the use of interstate facilities, to
further any "unlawful activity." See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976). Unlawful activity is defined to in-
clude "extortion, bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of
the United States." Id.
The Travel Act is a companion statute to the Hobbs Act; like the Hobbs Act, it provides a
vehicle for prosecuting political corruption. See Note, supra note 12, at 533. The proscription of
the Travel Act, however, includes both extortion and bribery. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976). In
addition, the jurisdictional scope of the Hobbs and Travel Acts are quite different. Compare
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 214-15 (1960) (Hobbs Act requires only "an effect on
interstate commerce"); United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 944 (1968) (same); Battaglia v. United States, 383 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 907 (1968) (same) with Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)
(Travel Act requires actual "travel in or use of the facilities of interstate commerce"); United
States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978) (same); United
States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 680 (2d Cir. 1973) (same). The requirement of a minimal effect
on interstate commerce renders a determination of what is "in" or "out" of interstate commerce
irrelevant, for even an activity which is wholly intrastate in character may have an effect on
interstate commerce. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 5-74
5-8 (1979).
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the jury was instructed that "extortion . . . is committed when property is
obtained by consent of the victim by wrongful use of fear, or when it is
obtained under color of official right." 48  On appeal, the Third Circuit up-
held the instruction4 9 and stated that the Hobbs Act "repeats the common
law definition of extortion, a crime which could only be committed by a
public official, and which did not require proof of threat, fear or duress." 50
The jurisdictional base of the Travel Act is further narrowed by the requirement that there
be a knowing and deliberate use of interstate travel or interstate facilities in order to achieve
the criminal act. United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d at 680; United States v. Ruthstein, 414 F.2d
1079, 1082 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Barrow, 229 F. Supp. 722, 726 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
aff'd, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967). The issue of whether
there was a knowing and deliberate use of interstate travel or facilities is determined by the
jury. United States v. Barrow, 229 F. Supp. at 726. Under the Hobbs Act, however, the ques-
tion of what constitutes an effect on interstate commerce is a question of law for the court to
determine. United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 424 n.ll (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1043 (1980); United States v. Lowe, 234 F.2d 919, 922-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
838 (1956).
48. 462 F.2d at 1229. The jury instruction described extortion under the color of official
right as
the wrongful taking by a public officer of money not due him or his office, whether or not
the taking was accomplished by force, threats or use of fear .... [E]xtortion as defined by
Federal Law is committed when property is obtained by consent of the victim by wrong-
ful use of fear or when it is obtained under color of official right.
Id. (emphasis added). Compare id. with notes 25-30 and accompanying text supra. Only one of
the four defendants objected to this instruction. 462 F.2d at 1228-29.
49. 462 F.2d at 1229.
50. Id. Blackstone defined common law extortion as "any officer's unlawfully taking, by color
of his office, from any man, any money or thing of value that is not due to him, or more than is
due, or before it is due." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 141
(Lewis ed. 1922) (footnotes omitted). See also 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §§ 1895-1900
(Kerr ed. 1912); 31 AM. JUR. 2d Extortion, Blackmail and Threats § 1, at 900 (1967). For an
informative survey of the elements of common law extortion, see LaTour v. Stone, 139 Fla. 681,
190 So. 704 (1939).
Several state statutes which embody the common law concept have been construed to
require that, to be guilty of extortion, a public official must wilfully and corruptly demand
money or property. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55, 58 (1880); Adler v.
Sheriff, 92 Nev. 641, 643, 556 P.2d 549, 550 (1976). In such jurisdictions, extortionate conduct
is generally considered to be a felony. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 1 (West
1970) (extortion is a felony); id. ch. 265, § 25 (extortion is punishable by imprisonment in a state
prison for up to 15 years or in the house of correction for not more than 2 1/2 years, or by a fine
of up to $5,000, or by both fine and imprisonment); NEV. REV. STAT. § 197.170 (1967) (extor-
tion is a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years in a state prison or by a fine of
up to $5,000, or both).
Other state statutes based on the common law, however, have been interpreted to require
merely the receipt of property or money by the officer in order to consummate the offense; the
officer need take no initiative. See, e.g., People v. Ritholz, 359 Mich. 539, 552, 103 N.W.2d
481, 487, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912 (1960); State v. Savoie, 67 N.J. 439, 446, 341 A.2d 598,
602 (1975). Under these statutes, however, extortion "under color of official right" is punishable
only as a misdeameanor. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.214, .504 (1968) (extortion
by public officers is a misdeameanor punishable by 90 days imprisonment and/or a $100 fine);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:85-7, :105-1 (West 1969) (receipt of illegal fee by a public officer is a
misdemeanor punishable by up to three years imprisonment and/or a $1,000 fine). Under the
"mere receipt" interpretation, the distinction between extortion and bribery vanishes. See
United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 435-36 (3d Cir. 1979) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976) (federal bribery statute; receipt of
anything of value constitutes the offense).
Modern statutes have broadened the scope of common law extortion to include takings by
private individuals induced by fear. United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289 (1969) (Travel
Act). For an analysis of the modern concepts of extortion, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMI-
NAL LAW 704-07 (1972).
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The court also explained that, while private persons could only violate the
Act by use of fear, 5 public officials could violate the Act by the use of fear
or by taking under color of official right.
52
The dimensions of the Kenny approach were further defined by the
Third Circuit in United States v. Mazzei, 53 the first reported Hobbs Act case /
decided solely on the basis of "color of official right" extortion.5 4 In Mazzei,
the victim, wishing to lease office space to the state, approached Mazzei, a
state senator, who reportedly was seeking office space for a state agency.
55
Unaware of the senator's lack of authority in the matter, the victim agreed to
make a payment to a senate reelection finance committee.5 6  The Third Cir-
cuit held that the victim's reasonable belief that the defendant had the au-
thority to control the disposition of governmental affairs on the victim's be-
half was sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Hobbs Act. 57  In so
holding, the court stated that "[a] violation of the statute may be made out
by showing that a public official through the wrongful use of office obtains
property not due him or his office, even though his acts are not accompanied
by the use of 'force, violence of fear.' "58
The Kenny approach was recently reaffirmed in a political corruption
prosecution when the Third Circuit decided United States v. Cerilli.59  In
Cerilli, local supervisors of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
51. 462 F.2d at 1229.
52. Id. The court supported the disjunctive interpretation of extortion under the Hobbs Act
by citing a number of extortion cases. See United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969);
United States v. Sutter, 160 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1947); State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35, 167 A.2d 161
(1961); State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355, 91 A.2d 751 (1952). But see note 66 infra.
53. 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1014 (1975).
54. 521 F.2d at 646-47 (Gibbons, J., dissenting), Prior to Mazzei, extortion cases prosecuted
under the Hobbs Act involved fact situations in which an element of fear was present. See, e.g.,
United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975);
United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974), affd in part, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975). Thus, prior Hobbs Act convictions were based on both
the "force or fear" and "color of official right" definitions. See also United States v. Kenny, 462
F.2d at 1210. For a discussion of Kenny, see notes 45-52 and accompanying text supra.
55. 521 F.2d at 641.
56. Id.
57. id. at 645.
58. Id., quoting Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1976) (citations omitted). For the full
text of § 1951(b)(2), see note 3 supra.
59. 603 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043(1980). The case was heard by
Judges Aldisert, Adams, and Higginbotham. Judge Higginbotham wrote the opinion of the
court. Judge Adams filed a concurring opinion. Judge Aldisert dissented. See 603 F.2d at 416-
17. A number of other recent corruption prosecutions have also applied the Kenny approach.
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1980) (school board official); United
States v. Summers, 598 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1979) (city councilman); United States v. Aram-
basich, 597 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1979) (county sheriff); United States v. Richardson, 596 F.2d 157
(6th Cir. 1979) (county sheriff); United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979) (school board official); United States v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340 (6th
Cir. 1978) (welfare commissioner); United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds, 445 U.S. 360 (1980) (state senator); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014
(8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979) (state legislator); United States v. Phillips,
577 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) (director of redevelopment agency);
United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978) (state
legislator).
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used their positions in order to obtain political contributions from local con-
tractors in exchange for contract awards. 60 The court held that the de-
fendants' solicitation of political contributions "under color of official right"
violated the Hobbs Act. 6 ' In so holding, the court noted that a contrary
decision would "overrule . . . the clear law of this circuit." 62  Judge Adams
concurred in the opinion of the court, but filed a separate opinion in order
to express his agreement with the dissent's view that the parties should have
been given the opportunity to address themselves to the validity of the
Kenny approach.
63
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Aldisert attacked the Kenny approach
to Hobbs Act extortion 64 by questioning that decision's departure from the
New York approach.6 5 Judge Aldisert contended that the case authority
cited by Kenny to support the disjoinder of the "force or fear" and "color of
right" phrases of the Hobbs Act did not compel the result. 66 Furthermore,
60. 603 F.2d at 418. Testimony elicited at trial established that at least some of the pay-
ments were made to a political committee. id. The court noted, however, that the fact that a
third party receives the benefits from the defendants' conduct does not preclude violation of the
Hobbs Act. Id. at 420. Accord, United States v. Green, 315 U.S. 415, 420 (1956) (gravamen of
offense is loss to victim; benefit to defendant is not required).
61. 603 F.2d at 425.
62. Id. The Kenny approach of the Third Circuit has been applied in political corruption
prosecutions in all the other courts of appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Summers, 598 F.2d
450 (5th Cir. 1979) (prosecution of city councilman); United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) (prosecution of redevelopment agency director); United
States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1977) (prosecution of
state real estate commission director); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976)
(prosecution of city commissioner); United States v. Hall, 536 F. 2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 919 (1976) (prosecution of state governor); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976) (prosecution of redevelopment authority director);
United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976) (pros-
ecution of city commissioner); United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974) (prosecu-
tion of city council chairman); United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd in
part, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975) (prosecution of city
alderman).
63. 603 F.2d at 426 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams indicated that, even though the
validity issue was initially addressed by the dissent, he still desired to allow the parties to brief
and argue the point. Id.
64. Id. at 426-37 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert had previously questioned the
broad interpretation of the Hobbs Act adopted by the majority in Mazzei, where he joined in
the dissenting opinion of Judge Gibbons. See United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d at 646-56
(Gibbons, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Mazzei, see notes 53-58 and accompanying text
supra. Judge Aldisert did not sit on the panel which decided the Kenny case. See United States
v. Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1209. For a discussion of Kenny, see notes 45-52 and accompanying text
supra.
In a recent Fifth Circuit case, Judge Aldisert's analysis in Cerilli was termed "convincing."
United States v. Williams 621 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1980) (Tate, J., concurring).
65. For a discussion of the New York approach, see notes 23-44 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's abandonment of this approach in Kenny, see notes
45-52 and accompanying text supra.
66. See 603 F.2d 427-29 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); cf. note 52 supra. Judge Aldisert de-
scribed the cases cited by Kenny in support of the disjunctive definition of extortion as inappo-
site or as providing minimal support. See id., distinguishing United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S.
286 (1969) (based on Travel Act); United States v. Sutter, 160 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1947) (based
on statute proscribing extortion by federal officer or employee); State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35, 167
A.2d 161 (1961) (dicta; based on state extortion statute); State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355, 91 A.2d
751 (1952) (dicta; based on state extortion statute).
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Judge Aldisert contended that Kenny should not be viewed as overruling the




A. Interpreting the Phrase "Color of Official Right"
The divergent approaches applied in interpreting the Hobbs Act can be
attributed to the Act's ambiguous legislative history, which would support
either the New York approach 68 or the Kenny approach.6 9  In addition,
problems in construing the Hobbs Act have resulted from the varying in-
terpretations of the Supreme Court's dicta in prior Hobbs Act prosecu-
tions. 70  It is submitted, however, that the broad construction of the Act in
Kenny has permitted extortion prosecutions beyond the intendment of Con-
gress.71
The current nationwide trend in interpreting the "color of official right"
branch of the Hobbs Act indicates that a public officer commits extortion by
67. 603 F.2d at 427 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Addonizio, see notes 32-41
and accompanying text supra. Addonizio was the last Hobbs Act extortion case decided in the
Third Circuit prior to Kenny. Under Third Circuit practice, only an en banc decision may
overrule a prior panel decision of that circuit. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT, ch. VIII(c) (1978).
The Cerilli defendants submitted a petition for rehearing en banc on the ground that Kenny
was not an en banc decision and therefore could not overrule Addonizio. See United States v.
Cerilli, No. 78-2105-07, slip op. at 1 (3d Cir., July 23, 1979) (denial of rehearing). Their peti-
tion, however, was denied. Id.
68. See Ruff, supra note 12, passim. Professor Ruff has taken the position that reliance on
New York law to interpret the Hobbs Act derives from two bases: 1) the 1934 Anti-Racketeering
Act-the predecessor of the Hobbs Act-used essentially the same language to define extortion
as the then current New York Penal Code; and 2) the comments of certain legislators indicated
that New York was the principal source of the federal definitional sections. Id. at 1183. See also
note 21 and accompanying text supra.
69. See Stern, supra note 12, passim. Judge Stern maintains that the legislative debate
indicated that the Hobbs Act was similar to New York law, but that Congress did not intend for
the law to be interpreted solely on the basis of the New York statute. Id. at 12.
70. Compare Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960) with United States v.
Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 423. The Cerilli court pointed to the fact that, in reference to the Hobbs
Act, the Supreme Court has stated that the "Act speaks in broad language, manifesting a pur-
pose to use all the Constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate
commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence." United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 423,
quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960). In Stirone, however, the Supreme
Court was dealing with the jurisdictional requirements of the Hobbs Act. See 361 U.S. at 218.
Thus, it would appear that the quoted language indicates that the Supreme Court desired to
broaden only the jurisdictional requirements of the Hobbs Act and not its substantive scope. Cf.
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) (Hobbs Act does not proscribe extortionate ac-
tivities by employees or union officials to attain legitimate union goals).
It should also be noted that the broad interpretation given to the Hobbs Act is contrary to
the rule of lenity which provides that ambiguities concerning the ambit of criminal statutes
should be resolved in favor of the defendant. Id. at 411. Accord, United States v. Adamo
Wrecking Co., 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1977); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); Bell
v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
71. See United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 435-36 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discus-
sion of Cerilli, see notes 59-67 and accompanying text supra.
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the simple act of receiving money or property from a victim. 72  Kenny, the
first case to define Hobbs Act extortion in this way, indicated a reliance on
the common law as codified by the states. 73 In so doing, however, it would
appear that the Third Circuit failed to recognize that, while threatless extor-
tion is treated as a misdemeanor in those states which proscribe it, 74 the
Hobbs Act punishes violators as felons. 75 In order to reconcile the crime of
"color of official right" extortion with the Hobbs Act's felony punishment, it
is at least arguable that Congress viewed the "color of official right" language
with reference to those jurisdictions which, like New York, require "wilful
and corrupt" demands to constitute extortion punishable as a felony.
76
In addition, the threatless extortion concept eliminates any meaningful
distinction between extortion and bribery. 77  This interpretation is, it is
submitted, inconsistent with the express terms of the Hobbs Act; if Con-
gress had intended to proscribe bribery, it could have explicitly done so. 78
Thus, it is contended that the application of the "color of official right" con-
cept, as it is applied in political corruption prosecutions involving threatless
extortion, was not contemplated by Congress and, therefore, should be
abandoned by the courts.
79
It is submitted that the need to construe the Hobbs Act to proscribe
threatless extortion is actually the product of a narrow definition of "duress"
applied by the early Hobbs Act cases.8 0 The Kubacki court built its defini-
tion of extortion upon two premises: 1) the essence of extortion is duress;
and 2) the essence of duress is interference with, or loss of, an existing
property right.8 1 Thus, the Kubacki court concluded that the defendants'
72. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1116 (1979); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 320 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 919 (1976).
73. 462 F.2d at 1229. For a discussion of Kenny, see notes 45-52 and accompanying text
supra.
74. See note 50 supra.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1976). Extortion under the Hobbs Act is a felony, punishable by a
$10,000 fine and/or 20 years in prison. Id.; id. § 1(1). See note 3 supra.
76. This interpretation would be more in conformity with the penalty imposed in Hobbs Act
prosecutions. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(e) (1976) (bribery of public official; felony) with id. §
201(0)-(i) (gratuity given to public official; misdemeanor). In order to secure a felony conviction
under § 201, the federal prosecutor must establish that the defendant had the requisite corrupt
intent. See United States v. Johnson, 621 F.2d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir.), pet. for cert. filed, 49
U.S.L.W. 3165 (Sept. 16, 1980); United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
As Justice Jackson noted in his discussion of federal criminal statutes generally: "[Congress] has
seen fit to prescribe that an evil state of mind, described variously in one or more such terms as
'intentional,' 'wilful,' 'knowing,' 'fraudulent,' or 'malicious,' will make criminal an otherwise in-
different act, or increase the degree of the offense or its punishment." Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 264 (1952) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
77. See United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 435-36 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discus-
sion of Cerilli, see notes 59-67 and accompanying text supra.
78. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976) (Hobbs Act) with id. § 1952 (Travel Act).
79. See United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 436 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of Cerilli, see notes 59-67 and accompanying text supra. Such treatment by the courts would be
in accordance with the rule of lenity, which construes ambiguities in penal statutes in favor of
the defendant. See note 70 supra.
80. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra.
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demand for a kickback on a future contract was not extortion. s2  As a con-
sequence of this holding, a large area of political corruption was left un-
reachable by federal authorities unless the corrupt official crossed a state
line.8
3
It is submitted, however, that, in attempting to fill the gap left by cases
applying the Kubacki analysis, the Kenny court used a hatchet when a paring
knife would have sufficed. By defining duress to include interference with
future property rights, as the court did in Addonizio,8 4 the Kenny court
could have reached objectionable conduct immunized by Kubacki while leav-
ing intact the distinction between extortion and bribery.8 5 Such a construc-
tion would also eliminate the problem of punishing "mere receipt" as a
felony since it would require proof that it was the official who demanded the
payment. 86
B. The Jurisdictional Element of the Hobbs Act
Both the Hobbs Act and the Travel Act 8 7 have been used by federal
prosecutors to combat political corruption.88 The jurisdictional base of the
Hobbs Act, however, is much broader than that of the Travel Act.89 Under
the Hobbs Act, any effect on interstate commerce is sufficient to establish
federal jurisdiction,9" while the Travel Act requires travel in, or use of the
facilities of, interstate commerce as a predicate to federal jurisdiction. 91
Therefore, as Judge Aldisert stated, "in situations where interstate travel or
use of interstate facilities cannot be proven, or where the knowing use of
them cannot be demonstrated, the federal government . . . must prosecute
local political corruption under the Hobbs Act or not at all." 
92
The combination of the broad jurisdictional base and the expansive in-
terpretation of the term "color of official right" 93 under the Hobbs Act has
provided federal prosecutors with a powerful tool with which to combat
82. 237 F. Supp. at 641-42. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
83. See text accompanying notes 90 & 91 infra.
84. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
86. This approach would also be consistent with the common law, which the Kenny court
considered to be codified by the Hobbs Act. See text accompanying note 73 supra. The "color
of official right" aspect of common law extortion was essentially a substitute for proof of threat,
fear, or duress. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976). For a discussion of the Travel Act, see note 47 supra.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Arambfsich, 597 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1979) (Hobbs Act pros-
ecution); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870
(1978) (Travel Act prosecution); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 919 (1976) (Hobbs and Travel Acts prosecution).
89. See United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 436 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of Cerilli, see notes 59-67 and accompanying text supra.
90. See note 47 supra.
91. See note 47 supra.
92. See United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 436 (Aldisert, J., dissenting), citing Stern,
supra note 12, at 11 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). For a discussion of Cerilli, see
notes 59-67 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 48-62 and accompanying text supra.
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political corruption. 94  Yet the development of such a weapon may not have
been intended by Congress.
95
In contrast to the Hobbs Act, the Travel Act has more stringent juris-
dictional requirements which assure a significant federal interest in prosecu-
tions under the Act's provisions. 96  Furthermore, the Travel Act expressly
proscribes both extortion and bribery. 9 7  It is therefore submitted that the
combination of the Travel Act's strict jurisdictional scope and its substantive
provisions commend it, rather than the Hobbs Act, as the more appropriate
method to penalize political corruption. 98
C. Federal Intrusion into Local Affairs
The ease with which federal prosecutors may attack political corruption
under the Hobbs Act also raises questions as to the propriety of allowing
federal prosecution of corruption which might more appropriately be kept in
check under state bribery or extortionn statutes. 99 The desirability of a lim-
ited role for the federal judiciary in relation to state courts rests not on
statutory mandate but on policy grounds. 10 0 Therefore, the federal courts
94. Federal indictments of state and local officials involved in corrupt activities increased
from 63 in 1970 to 337 in 1976. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 28, 1977, at 36. Former
Assistant Attorney General Richard Thornburgh attributed this increase to "imaginative and
innovative approaches to the body of federal criminal law." Thornburgh, Preface to The United
States Court of Appeals: 1974-1975 Term Criminal Law and Procedure, 64 GEO. L.J. 173, 173
(1975).
95. See notes 71-79 and accompanying text supra.
96. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971). The Supreme Court has observed:
"[A]n expansive [interpretation of the] Travel Act would alter sensitive federal-state relation-
ships, could overextend limited federal police resources, and might well produce situations in
which . . . matter[s] of happenstance, would transform relatively minor state offenses into fed-
eral felonies." Id. at 812. See also text accompanying note 91 supra.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(2) (1976). Consequently, acts of political corruption, manifested by
either a demand for something of value (extortion) or the mere receipt of something of value
(bribery), by a public official would fall within the ambit of the Travel Act. Furthermore, the
Travel Act's use of the local definitions of extortion and bribery permits local input in prosecu-
tions of local corruption. See note 47 supra.
The Travel Act is not without problems, however, in terms of federal enforcement. The
activities proscribed by the Travel Act are generally defined according to the law of the state in
which the prosecution takes place. See note 47 supra. Due to the lack of uniformity of the
definitions given to the proscribed acts, there is a lack of uniformity in the way the statute is
enforced. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT OF 1977, S. REP. No.
605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 627 (1977). The Travel Act also provides that proscribed activities
may be defined in accordance with federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b) (1976). Despite these
uncertainties, the Supreme Court has conspicuously avoided determining what the definition of
extortion would be under federal law. See United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289 (1969).
98. See United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 435-36 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discus-
sion of Cerilli, see notes 59-67 and accompanying text supra.
99. See notes 105-08 and accompanying text infra. It is conceded that the Travel Act also
provides a legitimate means of prosecuting political corruption because it adopts the state defini-
tions of the crimes of extortion and bribery. See note 47 supra.
100. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
539-40 (1947). Justice Frankfurter remarked:
The underlying assumptions of our dual form of government, and the consequent presup-
positions of legislative draftmanship which are expressive of our history and habits, cut
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need not defer to state decisionmaking power in all cases. Nevertheless,
when legitimate state interests are involved, the federal courts may opt to
assess the potential benefits and costs that will result from a federal court
determination of the case. 10 1
There is an obvious state interest in corruption prosecutions involving
state and local officials. 10 2 This interest is magnified when due considera-
tion is given to the liberal construction afforded the term "extortion" under
the Hobbs Act and the consequent ease with which a conviction may be
obtained' 0 3 and penalties imposed thereunder. 0 4  It is undoubtedly a prime
interest of the state to eliminate political corruption; therefore, it is submit-
ted that one must question the legitimacy of applying liberally interpreted
federal legislation in areas of intimate concern to the individual states. 10 5
The present Supreme Court has shown an inclination toward the expan-
sion of state sovereign power at the expense of federal power.10 6 The
Hobbs Act prosecutions, however, seem to run contrary to the spirit of the
expansion of state autonomy in areas in which the states have an overriding
interest. 10 7 Thus, the argument that such prosecutions represent an uncon-
across what might otherwise be the implied range of legislation. The history of congres-
sional legislation regulating not only interstate commerce as such but also activities in-
tertwined with it, justify the generalization that, when the Federal 'Government takes
over such local radiations in the vast network of our national economic enterprise and
thereby radically readjusts the balance of state and national authority, those charged with
the duty of legislating are reasonably explicit and do not entrust its attainment to that
retrospective expansion of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legisla-
tion.
Id. at 540.
101. Cf. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-21 (1977) (al-
though doctrine of abstention did not apply, considerations of judicial administration warranted
deference to state court proceedings); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (absent a
clear statement of congressional intent, federal court refused to extend its jurisdiction over case
involving the sensitive relations between federal and state criminal jurisdiction).
102. Cf United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 234-37 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) ("In an area in which state or local law has traditionally regulated primary activity, there is
good reason to restrict federal penal legislation within the confines of its language"). Indeed,
during the Hobbs Act debate, one member of Congress noted the paradox of enacting criminal
legislation under the aegis of the commerce clause when he stated:
It is difficult to understand why Members of Congress, whose entire records as national
legislators have been based upon the principle of State's rights, now stand up here and
attempt to fasten upon the Federal Government the responsibility of enforcing local law
in every city, village and hamlet in the Nation.
91 CONG. REC. 11903 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Welch).
103. See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
104. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
105. United States v. Janotti, No. 80-166, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Pa., filed Nov. 26, 1980)
("ABSCAM" convictions for Hobbs Act conspiracy representing substantial stretching of the
definition of extortion and expanding federal jurisdiction in derogation of state criminal jurisdic-
tion are impermissible).
106. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (federal minimum wage
statute ruled unconstitutional because it impairs the states' ability to function in a federal sys-
tem).
107. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REVISION ACT OF 1980, H. REP.
No. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 300-03 (1980). In examining this problem, and in considering
possible legislative solutions to it, the House Judiciary Committee has noted that
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stitutional or, at least, an undesirable federal incursion into the territory of
exclusive state sovereignty may find favor in the contemporary Supreme
Court.'0 8  The danger of allowing the continued use of the Third Circuit's
present interpretation of Hobbs Act extortion has been pointed out by one
commentator who suggested that the current approach might even permit
the conviction of a politician who attends a fundraising dinner and solicits
contributions from the businessmen present. 10 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The Hobbs Act has received liberal interpretation by the federal
judiciary. 110 While such liberality has facilitated prosecutions for corrup-
tion,"' its validity has been questioned in view of the Act's legislative his-
tory. 112  The criticism attributable to the liberal interpretation given to the
term "extortion" could be avoided by expanding the scope of the term
"duress." 113 Since the courts have failed to use this option, however, it is
submitted that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in a Hobbs Act
case to address itself to the legitimacy of the liberal construction of the term
"extortion" in the Act. Absent such judicial action, it might be appropriate
for Congress to enact a statute which would specify penalties for corrupt
political activities. Such an enactment should clearly state what acts are
proscribed, 114 what the penalty is, and the circumstances under which the
statute would be invoked. 115 If Congress does not choose to go this far,
then the Act should, it is suggested, at least be amended to reduce the
penalty for convictions "under color of official right."116 This would bring
[blecause of this delicate balance of State and Federal interests involved in prosecuting
local corruption .... [the proposed Act] provides a certification requirement for prosecu-
tions involving State or local public servants acting under color of office .... The certifi-
cation must state either that the State authorities were informed of, and acquiesced in,
the Federal prosecution prior to the charges, or that there were no pending State pro-
ceedings regarding the conduct at the time of the charges, and the State did not appear
likely to undertake such a prosecution.
Id. at 302.
108. But cf. Matter of Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1979) (attack on federal grand jury subpoenas as unconstitutional, for this
reason, rejected).
109. See Ruff, supra note 12, at 1196. See also United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d at 437
(Aldisert, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Cerilli, see notes 59-67 and accompanying text
supra.
110. See notes 45-62 and accompanying text supra.
111. See note 62 supra.
112. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 84-86 and accompanying text supra.
114. A precise enunciation of the illegal acts would free the courts from having to speculate
about the intent of the legislature, as the courts were forced to do in interpreting the Hobbs
Act. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
115. The penalty should, it is submitted, be divided into two categories: 1) an enhanced
penalty for payments made at defendant's initiative; and 2) a lesser penalty for payments re-
ceived by the defendant at the victim's initiative. See note 50 supra.
116. Specific guidelines should also be developed to ensure that the federal government does
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the Act more into line with the common law approach to extortion." 7  If
Congress refuses to take action on the matter, it is submitted that the fed-
eral judiciary should, in the absence of clear legislative intent, apply the rule
of lenity"18 and interpret Hobbs Act extortion in accordance with the New
York approach. 119
While the vigorous prosecution of political corruption is certainly lauda-
ble, it is not within the province of the courts to liberally interpret statutes
in order to achieve a result they deem desirable.12 0  Further, the failure of
the individual states to police their own public officials should not be used as
a pretext by the federal governrient to justify an attempt to remedy all social
wrongs which exist at the local level.
David E. Robbins
117. The Senate judiciary Committee has recommended that the penalty for extortion "under
color of official right" be reduced from the present twenty year maximum to a maximum of
three years in prison. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CRIMINAL CODE REFORM ACT OF 1977, S.
REP. No. 605, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 633 (1977). See notes 50 & 75 supra.
118. See note 70 supra.
119. See notes 23-41 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 84-86 and accompanying
text supra.
120. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). Justice Jackson has criticized
such overzealous prosecutions, stating:
The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and
balances in the scales of justice, The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the
requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the
defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose,
and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of
the immunities of the individual should not be extended to common-law crimes on judi-
cial initiative.
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